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BOOK REVIEW
STRIVING FOR RATIONALITY
Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul. By Jonathan
Lear. Harvard University Press. 1998.
Reviewed by Anne C. Dailey*
IN 1907, a young lawyer came to see Freud complaining of severe
symptoms that included obsessive fears of harm befalling both
his father and the woman he loved, obsessive rituals designed to
protect his father and that woman against such harm, compulsive
suicidal impulses such as cutting his throat with a razor or throwing
himself off a cliff, and tormenting fantasies involving sexual de-
filement and death. An otherwise intelligent and sensible young man,
the 29 year-old lawyer had spent years of his life fighting against these
obsessive ideas and impulses.' One day early in his year-long treat-
ment with Freud, he began to describe his obsession with a "specially
horrible punishment used in the East," one that involved live rats
boring their way into a person's anus.' Stricken with torment, the
young man leapt up from the couch, begging that Freud spare him
from reciting the details? In a similarly dramatic fashion later in his
treatment, the patient, while
heaping the grossest and filthiest abuse upon [Freud and his fam-
iy,] ... behaved like some one in desperate terror trying to save
himself from castigations of terrific violence; he would bury his
head in his hands, cover his face with his arm, jump up suddenly
and rush away, his features distorted with pain.4
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thanks to Doron
Ben-Atar, Steve Ecker, Jeremy Paul, Ernst Prelinger, Peter Siegelman and Nomi
Stolzenberg for helpful comments.
ISee 10 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud 158 (James Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1955) (1908)
[hereinafter Freud, 10 Standard Edition].
2 Id. at 166.
3 See id.
4 Id. at 209.
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What does it mean when this young patient leaps from the couch
and cringes in terror? Is the Rat Man rational or crazy?5 A lawyer
or a lunatic?
Jonathan Lear uses the image of Freud's famous patient cringing
in terror as a central motif in his recent book on the immanence of
irrationality in human affairs. A professor of philosophy and mem-
ber of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago,
as well as a trained psychoanalyst and one of the country's most out-
spoken defenders of Freud, Lear has gathered together a selection
of his essays, written over a fifteen year period, that comprise a sus-
tained meditation on what he describes as the fundamental Socratic
question: "In what way should one live?"' Drawing connections
among Plato, Freud, and Wittgenstein, to name only the most
prominently discussed thinkers in this book, Lear manages to
breathe new life into a centuries-old debate over the relationship be-
tween human nature and democratic life. The important theme that
connects these essays is Lear's effort to work out an account of the
important role that irrationality plays in human experience.
The study of irrationality is not a familiar topic in the law. De-
spite scattered references to psychoanalysis and the unconscious,
the law has remained remarkably resistant to the methods and in-
sights of psychoanalysis generally and the study of irrationality in
particular. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stressed the influence of un-
conscious ideas on the development of law,7 but his lasting
contribution has been the reasonableness standard of legal liability.'
5Freud referred to the patient as Dr. Lorenz, see id. at 254, although his real name,
we are told, was Ernst Lanzer. See Patrick J. Mahoney, Freud and the Rat Man 2
(1986). Peter Gay tells us that "it was Freud himself who referred to his famous patient
informally, with a measure of affection, as the Rattenmann, or, in English, as the 'man
of the rats."' Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time 261 (1988).
6Jonathan Lear, Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul 4 (1998) [hereinafter
Lear, Open Minded].
7 See Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 Duke LJ. 429 (1998)
[hereinafter Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind].
'The most important application of psychoanalytic ideas in the law was carried out
by Jerome Frank in Law and the Modem Mind, a book, despite its many flaws, whose
originality and importance has yet to be fully appreciated. See Jerome Frank, Law
and the Modem Mind (1930). Bruce Ackerman notes the unappreciated brilliance of
Frank's contribution. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Law and the Modem Mind by Jerome
Frank, 103 Daedalus 119 (1974). A few prominent scholars attempted to integrate
350 [Vol. 86:349
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Reason dominates, both as a descriptive model of human behavior
and as a prescriptive norm for legal rules and adjudicative out-
comes. Today the reasonable person is a canonical figure in the
law, legal rules are developed to further the aims of rational man,
and legal scholars promote the idea of bounded rationality. Ideas
such as the unconscious, repression, and motivated irrationality
are generally considered irrelevant, unscientific, unproven, and
obviously unsuited to law.9 The law as we know it operates on the
premise that individuals are autonomous, rational, self-governing
beings. Whatever its value or interest in the realms of literature,
art, philosophy, or even medicine, psychoanalytic ideas are taken
to be incompatible with a legal system founded upon the premise
of individual responsibility."
I am quite sure the law's resistance to irrationality reveals a
deep flaw in its ability to account for, and hence regulate, human
psychoanalysis into law earlier in this century. See Jay Katz et al., Psychoanalysis,
Psychiatry and Law (1967); C.G. Schoenfeld, Psychoanalysis and the Law (1973); Joseph
Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 Yale LJ. 1053 (1968); Robert S.
Redmount, Law as a Psychological Phenomenon, 18 Am. J. Juris. 80 (1973); Alan A.
Stone, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence: Revisited, in Moral Values and the Superego
Concept in Psychoanalysis (Seymour C. Post ed., 1972). More iecently, Charles R.
Lawrence III applied psychoanalytic ideas in the area of race discrimination. See Charles
R. Lawrence M, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987). The earliest discussion of psychoanalytic ideas in the
legal literature appears to be Theodore Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial
Opinions, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 89 (1918). Karl Llewellyn, for one, described the influence of
psychoanalytic ideas on legal realism: "In 1920, as a result of James Harvey
Robinson's Mind in the Making, a Freudian interpretation of judicial opinions broke
upon the little world of legal scholarship." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition: Deciding Appeals 12 (1960). Freud wrote directly about the application of
psychoanalysis to law in Psycho-analysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal
Proceedings, 9 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud 103 (James Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1959) (1908) [hereinafter
Freud, 9 Standard Edition].
9See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility:
Experts and the Unconscious, 68 Va. L. Rev. 971, 1015-16 (1982) (arguing that law
should reject all, or at least most, of psychodynamic theory as a scientific, causal
account of behavior).
10 See, e.g., Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74,79-80 (1942)
("Whatever doubts they have entertained as to the matter, the practical business of
government and administration of the law is obliged to proceed on more or less rough
and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature aid rational persons are in
control of their own conduct."); State v. Sikora, 210 A.2d 193,202 (NJ. 1965) ("Criminal
responsibility must be judged at the level of the conscious.").
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behavior. Although Lear's book does not address itself explicitly to
lawyers, judges, or legal scholars, the essays in this volume speak di-
rectly to the fact that law understates, or ignores altogether, the
important role of unconscious emotions and motivations in human
decisionmaking and behavior. Lear's book helps us to understand the
ways in which law must take account of unconscious emotions and
motivations if we are to maintain a legal system premised on a mean-
ingful conception of individual autonomy and democratic self-
government. The Rat Man's bizarre behavior is just an extreme ver-
sion of the everyday passions, loves, hatreds, fears, anxieties, and
hopes that affect ordinary people, often in unknown ways. In a world
that does not value self-reflection, reason can serve to rationalize or
cover over these unconscious feelings rather than to foster personal
self-control and democratic self-government. Psychoanalytic views
of rationality also have an important contribution to make to our
understanding of how institutions like the family and the work-
place facilitate the development of liberal citizens possessing the
psychological capacity for civic virtue. In addition, by focusing at-
tention on the immanence of irrationality in human nature, Lear
compels us, as lawyers and legal scholars, to question prevailing
assumptions about individual decisionmaking, choice, intent, and
motive in law. Overall, Lear's book offers the opportunity for as-
sessing what contemporary psychoanalysis has to offer law, how
psychoanalysis differs from currently popular behavioral and
cognitive psychologies, and what efforts are being made to es-
tablish psychoanalysis as an empirically grounded science.
At the heart of Lear's sustained consideration of irrationality are
two central claims. The first is a descriptive account of what it is to
be "minded" as we are: Lear provides a philosophical, quasi-empirical
description of human subjectivity as active, embodied, and inher-
ently, if only intermittently, irrational. By irrationality, Lear means
those occasions when people intentionally act in ways that contra-
dict their own system of values, beliefs, and commitments.'1 Most
philosophers, along with most of the rest of us, recognize that indi-
11 See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 81.
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viduals are not rational all of the time." Yet as Lear points out,
moments of irrationality are generally regarded as exceptions that
prove the rule of rationality. Lear challenges this view by arguing
that irrationality, too, is part of the rule, as fundamental and essen-
tial as reason itself. The mechanisms of irrationality, he contends,
can and should be approached from a perspective that blends the
empirical insights of psychoanalysis with the conceptual rigor of
philosophical inquiry. This perspective reveals in what way the
human capacity for rational thought is a developmental achieve-
ment inherently subject to irrational disruptions from unconscious
desires and feelings.
The idea that irrationality and its disruptive effects are inherent
in human nature-indeed define in part what it means to be hu-
man-leads Lear to his second, prescriptive claim: that democratic
freedom, as well as serious philosophical inquiry, turn on recogniz-
ing the many ways in which meaning in our lives is governed by
unknown, and sometimes unknowable, motivations and feelings.
Lear argues that psychoanalysis is a powerful tool for understand-
ing and facilitating the psychological processes by which citizens
become capable of living meaningful, self-directed lives. He explains
how the psychoanalytic model of human development, called object
relations theory, elucidates the dynamic relationship between indi-
vidual identity and political community or, in Lear's terms, psyche
and polis. Lear's conception of the way in which psyche and polis
are mutually interdependent leads him to propose that an open-
minded citizenry is an important, if not necessary, condition of de-
mocratic society. Lear argues that democratic engagement with the
fundamental question of how to live one's life, both as an individ-
ual and as a collective enterprise, requires an appreciation of the
elusive, disruptive, creative, and potentially self-destructive forces
of mind.
Given the title Open Minded, one could hardly be faulted for as-
suming that Lear intends to promote the standard liberal account
of human flourishing in a culturally diverse world. Yet it would be
wrong to assume that Lear's book concerns itself with liberalism's
12 See generally Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality
(1983) [hereinafter Elster, Sour Grapes].
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cardinal principle of tolerance for other points of view. Instead
Lear defines "open minded" as the capacity to know ourselves as
beings with unconscious feelings and motivations that move us to
behave in mysterious and irrational ways. 3 He means to challenge
the standard liberal account of individuals as rationally minded
beings, and he does so by building upon a descriptive account of
human nature that puts irrationality at the center rather than the
periphery of human experience.14 Relying on psychoanalytic clini-
cal work and theory, this collection of essays lays the foundation
for an empirical model of human irrationality robust enough to
challenge the prevailing liberal model of rationality and decision-
making. By advocating what he calls a science of subjectivity1 -
psychoanalysis-that takes seriously the important and ineradica-
ble place of unconscious motivations and feelings in human affairs,
Lear's work provides a more meaningful, empirically based account
of what it takes to sustain individual autonomy and democratic free-
dom in our liberal state.6
My argument about the relevance of Lear's thesis to law pro-
ceeds in two parts. First, I discuss how the model of human nature
employed in law and economics scholarship reflects a fundamental
human striving for rationality, but one that overlooks the develop-
13Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 8.
14As Lear notes, the centrality of irrationality to mindedness is what distinguishes
psychoanalytic investigation from the tradition of Socratic philosophy: "Rather than
starting, as Socrates does, with an argument that mind must be rational, and then
wondering how irrationality can be tacked on, psychoanalysis, when properly understood,
begins with the idea that mind must be sometimes irrational. The possibility of disruption
is built into the very idea of mindedness." Id. at 90.
15See Jonathan Lear, Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation
of Freudian Psychoanalysis (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Lear, Love and Its Place in
Nature]; Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 31.
16 Lear's thesis that mental life is characterized as much by irrational disruptions of
meaning as by conscious rational thought can be placed in the tradition of writers
such as Shakespeare, Proust, and Nietzsche, an observation that Lear himself makes
several times in this book, see Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 18, 28, 54, as well
as the late 18th century English Romantic poets. Although Lear rejects the idea that
subjective experience affords a glimpse of transcendent meaning or universal truths,
there is nevertheless an emphasis in his work on the imaginative processes and their
disruptive, creative, developmental, and unfathomable nature that has a strongly
romantic flavor to it. Despite this family resemblance, Lear's philosophical views and
temperament are, like Freud's, decidedly on the side of scientific empiricism.
[Vol. 86:349354
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mental and unconscious elements in human decisionmaking. As a de-
scriptive matter, the model of bounded rationality, which incorporates
the work of cognitive psychologists, cannot explain why people fre-
quently fail to further their own self-interest. It cannot explain the
phenomena of repression, self-denial, self-destructive urges, or weak-
ness of the will, nor can it account for behavior motivated by
unconscious passions, anxieties, fears, and hopes of everyday life.
The economists' failure to attend to irrational and self-defeating
forms of thinking threatens to reduce the legal ideal of individual
autonomy, and the related ideas of choice, preference, and self-
control, to their most shallow forms. In addition to its descriptive
limitations, therefore, the model of bounded rationality reinforces
a normative legal culture in which the conditions for effective self-
government, including the capacity for personal self-reflection and
collective deliberation, are increasingly diminished.
Next, I consider the implications of Lear's thesis about irration-
ality for the study of legal doctrine. I use the legal regulation of
parenthood and the rules governing the education of future citi-
zens as an example of the relevance of Lear's ideas about the
relationship of psyche and polis to law.17 The question of how
children acquire and retain the capacities for rational thought and
autonomous decisionmaking is of central importance to working
out the ideal of citizenship in a liberal democracy. This Part also
considers the application of Lear's ideas to the constitutional prin-
ciples of privacy and equality, as well as to other doctrinal areas
where legal liability turns on questions about human decisionmak-
ing, choice, motive, or intent. In the Conclusion, I suggest in what
ways psychoanalysis can be considered a scientific discipline, and I
17See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 Tul. L. Rev.
955 (1993) [hereinafter Dailey, Constitutional Privacy]. In a future article, I plan to
examine the relevance of psychoanalytic ideas to the doctrine of free speech by
focusing on the connection between the doctrine's roots in the idea of individual
autonomy on the one hand, and democratic self-government on the other. Lear's
thesis also enriches the view, which I have taken elsewhere, that contemporary
psychoanalysis offers feminists a normative framework for conceptualizing individual
autonomy to take into account the developmental roots of human relationships. See
Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1846-49 (1995)
[hereinafter Dailey, Federalism and Families]; Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to
Liberalism, 102 Yale LJ. 1265,1275-76 (1993) (book review).
2000] 355
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identify those areas in which the clinical, experimental, and neuro-
scientific validation of psychoanalytic ideas is being carried out.
Early in his book, Lear observes: "It has crossed my mind to
wonder whether it isn't the point of all professions-of medicine
and law as much as of philosophy and psychoanalysis-to instill
deadness.""8 Deadness in law, to Lear, means the establishment of
fixed norms that stifle open and honest engagement with the ques-
tion of how to live in a world that often escapes transparent
meaning." Lear's critique of the professions comes startlingly close
to Holmes's well-known observation that "the life of the law" is
not logic but experience, by which Holmes meant unconscious as
well as conscious experience." From early on in his career, Holmes
was keenly aware of the role that unconscious mental processes
play in determining individual behavior as well as legal decision-
making.
21
That is not to say that the depths of unconscious experience can
be studied directly (indeed, the point of Lear's book is exactly the
opposite) but rather that unconscious processes do operate in ac-
cordance with certain, identifiable mental processes and that these
processes can be empirically, albeit indirectly, studied and under-
stood. Most scholars of human decisionmaking are content to
develop mathematical formulas, statistical graphs, and cost-benefit
analyses, but seem unable to grapple with "the enigmatic nature of
human motivation.' In this collection of erudite and often engag-
ing essays, Jonathan Lear shows us how we can, and should, begin
to do just that.
is Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 3.
19 See id. at 3-4.
2Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 5 (1881) (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown, and Co. 1963).
"1Even as great a legal mind as Justice Holmes had difficulty reconciling his belief in
the unconscious forces of mind with his more tough-minded approach to legal rules
and decisions; eventually Holmes promoted an objective standard of liability that
avoided the problem of irrationality by bracketing subjective experience altogether.
See Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, supra note 7, at 434-37.
"2Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 28-29.
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I. THE IMMANENCE OF IRRATIONALITY
This Section presents Lear's argument that the experience of ir-
rationality is a condition of being a human being with a particular
kind of mind-a condition of our being "minded" in the way we
are. Being minded as we are means, in Lear's words, that we share
"perceptions of salience, routes of interest, feelings of naturalness
in following a rule, and so on which constitute being part of a cer-
tain form of life. ' We are minded so as to understand, for example,
that seven plus five equals twelve, that measuring follows certain
predictable rules, and that infants are developing human beings. To
the extent we can imagine a primitive tribe with a different form of
life, one that might believe, for example, that seven plus five equals
fifteen or that infants are food, "we have not reached a case of
other-mindedness; we have simply passed beyond the outer bounds
of our mindedness into incoherence."' Not to be minded in the
only way we know is not irrationality but a loss of mind altogether,
a psychotic breakdown of rationalizing systems of thought.' In con-
trast to true craziness, Lear contends, irrationality is a central part
of what it means to have a mind capable of a rationalizing system
of thought.
In philosophical terms, rationality is often defined as action that
an agent chooses out of a belief that it will bring about a desired
end' Lear broadens this standard definition somewhat by emphasiz-
ing that behaviors or decisions are rational when they are consistent
with the individual's broader system of beliefs and desires. The con-
cept of rationality as understood by Lear turns on the ability to give
a full or coherent account of what one is doing by situating one's
"Id. at 249.
2Id. at 251.
'
5
"There is no getting a glimpse of what it might be like to be 'other-minded,' for as
we move toward the outer bounds of our mindedness we verge on incoherence and
nonsense." Id. at 250.
26See Jules L. Coleman, Rational Choice and Rational Cognition, 3 Legal Theory
183, 183 (1997); John C. Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in
Rational Choice 82, 83 (Jon Elster ed., 1986). Jon Elster refers to this definition of
rationality as the "thin theory" of individual rationality. Elster, Sour Grapes, supra
note 12, at 2-3. Later in this Review I address the relationship of Lear's concept of
irrationality to the definition of rationality as the maximization of expected utility in
law and economics scholarship. See infra notes 115-41 and accompanying text.
2000] 357
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actions within a system of beliefs, desires, and intentions. Animals
might act purposefully, and in that sense act for reasons, but only
humans "are able to think about what they want, to subject their
desires and beliefs to self-conscious scrutiny, and to modify them in
the light of criticism."' Thus, like most philosophers, Lear accepts
the Socratic view that "some presumption of rationality is built into
the very ideas of mind and action."' Yet Lear goes on to examine
why, at times, individuals think or act in ways that contradict their
system of beliefs. Lear contends that moments of irrationality are
not only common, but are central to the experience of being
minded: "[I]t is intrinsic to the very idea of mind that mind must be
sometimes irrational."29 Irrationality, Lear argues, is an inescapable
factor in human experience.
Let us take the Rat Man, Freud's patient introduced at the be-ginning of this Review, as an illustration of what Lear means by
irrationality. If the Rat Man leapt from the couch in terror because
he believed that Freud was physically attacking him, then we would
say that he was simply mistaken (e.g., he mistakes Freud's reaching
for a cigar as an attempted blow) or crazy (e.g., he thinks Freud's
cigar is a club). Similarly, if the patient had leapt off the couch invol-
untarily or unconsciously, he would not have been acting irrationally
in the sense Lear means it here. Involuntary, random, or crazy acts
are unmotivated events that fall outside the sphere of minded behav-
ior. But this is not the case with the Rat Man, for the cringing and the
leaping, Lear says, are an expression of mind? It is only because the
Rat Man's cringing and leaping occur within a system of rational
thought that they may properly be called irrational in the first
place. Here Lear echoes Jon Elster's view that "[w]e must be able
to make sense of a person on the whole, if we are to be able to say
that some of his plans do not make sense."31 Beliefs or acts outside
21 Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 81.
2Id.
2Id. at 84.
See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 93-101.
31Elster, Sour Grapes, supra note 12, at 11 (concluding that "global rationality is a
precondition for imputing intentions to a person, be they irrational."); see also Jon
Elster, Introduction, in Rational Choice 27 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) [hereinafter Elster,
Introduction] (arguing that irrationality can only be predicated on a broad background
of rationality).
358 [Vol. 86:349
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the system of rational thought are nonrational, or even nonmental,
events.32
Nor does the irrationality of the Rat Man's cringing and leaping
lie in a failure to conform to what others think is reasonable under
the circumstances, although that might of course be the case. In-
stead the Rat Man's irrationality resides in his failure to conform his
behavior to his own personal system of values, beliefs and commit-
ments 3 Irrationality, as it is understood here, entails a contradiction
between one's actions or stated beliefs and how one would take one-
self to be, if questioned.' Lear identifies the most important category
of irrational behavior as "akratic," or what are sometimes called in-
continent, acts: "the intentional performance of an act for which
one believes one has less-good reasons than for another act."'35 A
person who genuinely believes attending college is the best choice
for his or her future but nevertheless fails to show up for classes
could be said to be acting akratically. Other categories of irration-
ality in addition to akrasia are wishful thinking and self-deception,
situations where the individual's reasoned sense of self is de-
feated.' Returning to the Rat Man, we know he acts irrationally
because, despite the fact that he is consciously aware that he is in
the safety of Freud's consulting room, he acts as though he is in
3See Donald Davidson, Paradoxes of Irrationality, in Philosophical Essays on Freud
289, 289 (Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins eds., 1982) [hereinafter Davidson,
Paradoxes of Irrationality] ("For the irrational is not merely the nonrational, which lies
outside the ambit of the rational; irrationality is a failure within the house of reason.").
""The sort of irrationality that makes conceptual trouble is not the failure of
someone else to believe or feel or do what we deem reasonable, but rather the failure,
within a single person, of coherence or consistency in the pattern of beliefs, attitudes,
emotions, intentions and actions." Id. at 290.
4See Sebastian Gardner, Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis 3 (1993).
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 81. In attempting to work out a plausible
account of practical reason, Donald Davidson defines incontinent actions in the
following way: "If a man holds some course of action to be the best one, everything
considered, or the right one, or the thing he ought to do, and yet does something else,
he acts incontinently." Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events 21 (1980)
[hereinafter Davidson, Actions and Events]. In contrast, Jon Elster refers to
incontinent acts as a problem of impatience. See Elster, Sour Grapes, supra note 12,
at 7.
3See Gardner, supra note 34, at 16; David Pears, Motivated Irrationality 6-17 (1984).
Acting counter to what one believes is also sometimes referred to as weakness of the will.
See Davidson, Paradoxes of Irrationality, supra note 32, at 294.
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danger of mortal attack. There exists a seemingly unbridgeable gap
between his conscious self-knowledge and his manifest behavior. 7
Philosophical accounts of irrationality, Lear tells us, have in
general taken one of two approaches to explaining the phenome-
non. One approach, which Lear identifies with Aristotle, has been
to understand the self-contradiction that signals irrationality as a
product of ignorance: The mind's "knowledge of the better alterna-
tive is somehow shut down."' Knowledge of the better alternative
might be forgotten or repressed, or it might be ousted from con-
sciousness by a condition of intoxication, overriding pleasure, or
trauma. 9 An alternative approach "divides the mind into mindlike
parts," each of which is its own locus of rationality and intentional-
ity.' In this view, the unconscious mind possesses rational desires
and beliefs that can lead to acts in conflict with the desires and beliefs
of the conscious mind; the irrational self-contradiction is simply the
product of a conflict between two different, but equally rational, sys-
tems. These accounts of irrationality, while having something in
common with Freud's early theories of mind,4' nevertheless leave
Lear dissatisfied because they retain the idea that mind is, by defini-
tion, rational, and that irrationality can be attributed either to
37 There is another possible interpretation of the Rat Man's leaping and cringing
that would go some way toward rationalizing the strange behavior. It is at least
possible that the Rat Man's behavior was a reasonable response to Freud's
unconscious hostile feelings, what would now be called countertransference. At least
one other famous patient of Freud, named Dora, experienced him in that way,
abruptly ending the treatment. See 7 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 109 (James Strachey trans.,
Hogarth Press 1953) (1905) [hereinafter Freud, 7 Standard Edition].
31 Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 82.
39 See Davidson, Actions and Events, supra note 35, at 42.
40Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 82. For an example of the two-minds
argument in the legal literature on rational choice, see Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1555-56 (1998).
For a critique of the two-minds theory, see Gardner, supra note 33, at 40-45.
41 What Lear calls the Aristotelian theory has much in common with Freud's early
cathartic theory of neurosis. See 2 Josef Breuer & Sigmund Freud, The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 261 (James Strachey
trans., Hogarth Press 1955) (1893). The two-minds view, of course, resembles the
topographic model. See 5 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 536-41 (James Strachey trans., Hogarth Press
1955) (1905).
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ignorance or to a conflict between rationally motivated beliefs or
desires.
Lear argues that what is significant about irrational acts and be-
liefs is their inarticulateness: They are feelings or actions for which
no explanation is or can be given.42 For example, we know the Rat
Man behaves irrationally when he leaps and cringes in Freud's con-
sulting room because he cannot explain the apparent contradiction
between his knowledge that he is safe and his manifest terror. He
might be able to construct, after the fact, an explanation for his
fearful behavior, such as that he had transferred his childhood fear
of his father onto Freud, but Lear argues that such explanations
are only post hoc rationalizations for behavior that, at the moment
it occurs, does not yet stand for anything. Reflexive breakdown, as
Lear calls this lapse of self-understanding, is inexplicable: It has not
yet been integrated into a coherent account of the individual's
life.43 And to the extent that this lapse of self-understanding mani-
fests itself in actions like leaping, cringing, crying, shouting, or even
silence, it is, by definition, disruptive of ordered thought and
speech.
[T]here are many ways in which a person may disrupt his
thought activity which do not involve the creation of a new
meaning: by stuttering or sneezing, by repeatedly getting up to
go to the bathroom, by having intrusive thoughts which break
in on one's train of thought, and so on.'
Although the Rat Man might later say, in reflecting upon his bizarre
conduct, "I was afraid of Freud like I was afraid of my father," Lear
contends that this idea did not actually pre-exist or accompany the
bizarre conduct nor did it cause the behavior to happen. The affec-
tive state of fear, expressed in the acts of cringing and leaping,
disrupted the Rat Man's sense of self, his speech, and, to the extent
he also suffered from suicidal impulses, potentially his survival.
42 See Davidson, Actions and Events, supra note 35, at 42 ("What is special in
incontinence is that the actor cannot understand himself. he recognizes, in his own
intentional behaviour, something essentially surd."). Id.
43 See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 101.
41 Id. at 107.
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In Lear's view, the moment of reflexive breakdown (e.g., cringing
in terror) is the enactment of mind's power, indeed mind's tendency,
to disrupt itself.45 The idea that mind exhibits aii inherent tendency
to disrupt itself was first developed, brilliantly, by Freud in his work
on the importance of dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes, and other
everyday occurrences. As Freud once observed, "[hie that has eyes
to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can
keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; be-
trayal oozes out of him at every pore."' Lear links this view of the
inherent disruptiveness of mind to the basic psychoanalytic princi-
ple that rationality is a developmental achievement rather than a
psychological given.47 The elemental forms of mental activity, what
Freud called "primary process," are the type of mental functioning
dominant in infancy when the preverbal child's mental life is gov-
erned by the pleasure principle; other mental processes dominant
at this time include imagistic thinking, displacement, condensation,
and hallucinatory perception. As the child grows, these elemental
forms of thinking evolve into higher mechanisms of thought, which
Freud called secondary process, and which eventually include, at
adulthood, what we consider rational, logical, reality-based think-
41 See id. at 84.
Sigmund Freud, 7 Standard Edition, supra note 37, at 77-78. Freud often wrote as
if he believed that the unconscious contained already-formed ideas that find
expression in dreams and parapraxes. Lear does not adopt Freud's view that the
psychoanalyst, in the tradition of the natural scientist, uncovers ideas already existing in
the patient's unconscious. Instead, Lear argues that what finds expression in moments of
irrational thought or behavior are feelings not yet understood or articulated. Lear views
the analyst's role as developmentally transforming the patient's inarticulate feelings into
conscious, rational thought. See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 103-04. Lear's views
on the inexplicable, archaic aspect of irrational behavior draw heavily on the work of
object-relations theorists. See id. at 328 n.1.
47 Contemporary psychoanalysts differ in their views about the origins of such
development: Neo-Freudian analysts, like Lear, believe that rationality develops in
the service of gratifying instinctual needs, whereas ego psychologists view rational
thought as unfolding autonomously as part of an innate process of biological
maturation. See, e.g., Heinz Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation
(David Rapaport trans., International Universities Press 1986) (1958). Whether one
attributes the origins of rationality to the gratification of instinctual drives of one kind or
another, to genetic programming, or to something else altogether, the important
point is that any psychoanalytically oriented psychology understands rationality
as a developmental achievement.
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ing. Lear thus attributes the inexplicable, disruptive quality of irra-
tional moments in our lives to the origins of mind in the infant's
primitive modes of thought. Echoing Freud's description of the
mind as an archeological dig, with the older, more primitive layers
buried beneath newer, more advanced modes of thought and
memory, Lear describes the existence of primitive mental mecha-
nisms that are the precursors to more mature rational mentation.'
In his leaping and cringing the Rat Man is, among other things,
putting the archaic origins of mind on display."
Lear considers his theory of irrationality to be an empirical ac-
count of mind, but he considers it to be conceptually required as
weUY The idea that minds have an inherent tendency to disrupt them-
selves follows from Lear's definition of what it means to be minded in
the first place. Minds, Lear argues, are by nature restless, which
means they "must be able to make leaps, to make associations, to
43 The psychoanalyst Hans Loewald provides a helpful description of the way in
which primary process thinking remains an active force throughout the individual's
life:
Primary and secondary process are ideal constructs. Or they may be described
as poles between which human mentation moves. I mean this not only in the
longitudinal sense of progression from primitive and infantile to civilized and
adult mental life and regressions in the opposite direction. Mental activity
appears to be characterized by a to and fro between, an interweaving of, these
modes of mental processes, granted that often one or the other is dominant and
more manifestly guiding mentation and that the secondary process assumes an
increasingly important role on more advanced levels of mentation. Language
itself, considered in terms of these categories, partakes of those two sides of the
coin of mentation. The primary process quality or suggestiveness of language is
apparent in certain kinds of schizophrenic speech as well as in poetry, especially
modem poetry, and in modem prose by writers such as Joyce or Faulkner. We
see here that what we call dynamically unconscious processes can be compatible
with conscious awareness and verbalization, as though there were a direct leap
from primary process to conscious awareness, omitting preconscious, secondary
process mediation, despite the fact of expression in words.
Hans W. Loewald, Papers on Psychoanalysis 178-79 (1980).
49See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 101.
See id. at 84 ("This isn't only an empirical discovery about the human mind ... it
also comes to light when we think about what it is to be minded."). See also Davidson,
Actions and Events, supra note 35, at 29 ("Does it never happen that I have an
unclouded, unwavering judgement that my action is not for the best, all things
considered, and yet where the action I do perform has no hint of compulsion or of the
compulsive? There is no proving such actions exist; but it seems to me absolutely
certain that they do.").
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bring things together and divide them up in all sorts of strange
ways. 51 The idea that "a mind must have at least the potentiality for
creativity"'52 derives from the fact that minds exist in bodies: "[I]t
is part of the idea of mind that a mind is part of a living organism
over which the mind has incomplete control and that it helps the
organism to live in an environment over which the organism has
incomplete control."'53 The creative activity of mind, its intensity
and plasticity, is what allows the individual to interact with his en-
vironment so as to satisfy his needs. From the moment the infant
turns its head in anticipation of milk, for example, or cries out in
hunger, it learns to express itself in ways that bring it the instinctual
satisfaction it craves.' The restless nature of mind that operates
from the earliest instinctual searching brings both the possibility of
satisfaction (e.g., in the form of nourishment and object love) as
well as frustration (e.g., in the form of misunderstanding and loss).
The innate activity of mind is always, to some degree, unsettling.
For the Rat Man on the couch it was unsettling in the extreme.
The Rat Man's effort to banish his hostile feelings about his father
illuminates the creative, sometimes even poetic, aspect of irrationality.
Maternal love, friendship, romance, artistic inspiration, transcendent
faith, and heroic greatness are all examples of the life-sustaining and
affirming power of the irrational in our lives. "[U]nconscious mental
functioning is not everywhere disruptive: it can infuse one's con-
scious, emotional life with joy and creativity."5 One of the more
creative ways in which the Rat Man attempted to mitigate his guilt
over his fantasies of his father undergoing the rat torture was to
engage in protective prayers. In his description of the case, Freud
tells us:
51 Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 84-85.
m Id.
5' Id.
m The concept of a drive, like hunger or sexuality, for example, "lends content to the
idea of a mind embodied in a nonomnipotent organism which must interact with an
environment to satisfy its needs." Id. at 88. In emphasizing the active quality of
mental life, Lear's views resonate with classical Freudian drive theory, although in
this book Lear does not focus on the sexualized nature of those strivings. See Lear,
Love and Its Place in Nature, supra note 15, at 120-55.
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 87.
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At the time of the revival of his piety he made up prayers for
himself, which took up more and more time and eventually
lasted for an hour and a half. The reason for this was that he
found, like an inverted Balaam, that something always inserted
itself into his pious phrases and turned them into their opposite.
E.g., if he said "May God protect him," an evil spirit would hur-
riedly insinuate a "not." On one such occasion the idea occurred
to him of cursing instead, for in that case, he thought, the contrary
words would be sure to creep in. His original intention, which had
been repressed by his praying, was forcing its way through in this
last idea of his. In the end he found his way out of his embar-
rassment by giving up the prayers and replacing them by a short
formula concocted out of the initial letters or syllables of various
prayers. He then recited this formula so quickly that nothing
could slip into it.'
The story of the Rat Man's prayer captures both the conscious
rationality of the protective prayer (i.e., "If I utter this prayer, then
my father will not suffer the rat torture") and the irrationality of
the inserted "not," in which we witness "a mental activity too
primitive to be understood as the outcome of belief and desire. '
Indeed, it is in the very nature of irrational disruptions to be irre-
pressible, such as in the forcible, but unintended, insertion of the
"not... "Primitive expressions of hostility thus survive, unintegrated
into rational thought," disrupting conscious life in creative, but also
potentially destructive, ways."
Lear's ideas about the immanence of irrationality are not a refu-
tation of rationality. To the contrary, psychoanalysis in general
posits rationality as a primary axis of individual development as
well as one aim of the therapeutic process. The value of psychoana-
lytic self-reflection lies in its synthesizing function: It promotes an
integration of irrational feelings into one's conscious sense of self,
allowing for a unification of ideas and feelings at higher, increas-
"Id. at 106 (quoting Freud, 10 Standard Edition, supra note 1, at 193).
57Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 106.
Is Id. at 107. Cleverly, Lear remarks: "That is, even as he is trying to protect his
father from the rat-torture by uttering a prayer, he reenacts the torture by shoving a
'not' up the ass of his utterance. The 'not' intrudes inside the utterance and eats away
at its meaning." Id. at 108.
5Id. at 107.
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ingly verbal and abstract levels of psychological functioning. The Rat
Man, for example, came to Freud for the purpose of working through
his irrational fears and obsessions; integration of his irrational feelings
occurred in the process of understanding the fantasies of rat tortu're,
the protective prayers, the leaps and cringes. Lear describes the Rat
Man's therapeutic experience:
It is the process Freud called "working-through:" the enduring
attempt to give a meaning to the phantasy activity itself. Rather
than simply stating the meaning of a cringe, the interpretation
would try to state (in understandable terms) what the Rat Man
is doing with that cringe. In that way, the phantasy activity
would itself come to have meaning for the Rat Man, come to be a
possible object of thought, and thus gain some genuine integration
into the rationality system .... The effect is that intrapsychic struc-
ture gets loosened up-and a real possibility of psychic integration
emerges. °
The process of working-through involves the integration of irra-
tional feelings into the system of rational thought, a process that
ideally promotes psychic growth and increased self-control.6' Neu-
rosis arises when the individual is unable to integrate these moments
of reflexive breakdown in a meaningful way: The neurotic suffers
from repetition, as Freud discovered, unable to understand and hence
move beyond the subjective experience of terror, fear, or despair. The
therapeutic aim, as Lear would have it, is to transform these inexpli-
cable, affect-laden disruptions into conscious, articulate, and coherent
self-understandings. 2
6Id. at 103-04.
61 Hans Loewald describes this process as carried out by the ego:
[W]e want to stress the point that the boundaries between ego and external
reality develop out of an original state where, psychologically, there are no
boundaries and therefore there is no distinction between the two.
It is from here that the synthetic, integrative function of the ego can be
understood. The ego mediates, unifies, integrates because it is of its essence to
maintain, on more and more complex levels of differentiation and objectivation
of reality, the original unity.
Loewald, supra note 48, at 11.
2Lear notes that in Freud's later writings on transference:
The accent of his writings shifts from transference as a transfer (across a given
world) to transference as a repetition. The cost of keeping something out of
consciousness, Freud says, is that one acts it out unconsciously. Repetition is the
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Lear's approach departs from standard philosophical writing on
rationality in his emphasis on the immanent and developmental na-
ture of irrationality. He also departs from standard philosophy in his
effort to work out "the logic of the soul" in a way that integrates
empirical and conceptual inquiry. Having described the centrality of
irrationality in human experience, Lear goes on to prescribe the im-
portance of integrating an understanding of irrationality into our
conception of democratic self-government. This argument, summa-
rized in the following pages, connects the ideal of citizenship in a
liberal democracy to the psychoanalytic model of rational self-
reflection and discourse.
II. OPEN MINDS AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
Over the last century, Freud has enjoyed the dubious honor of
being the object of contempt from both sides of the political divide:
Social conservatives have viewed his ideas as radically individualistic
and subversive of social order, and social progressives have accused
him of reinforcing oppressive social hierarchies and the moral status
quo.' Yet whatever their respective merits, (and it might be that both
perspectives are right to some degree)' these critical views obscure
the point that psychoanalysis provides at its foundational level a psy-
return of the repressed, in unconscious form. This reenactment is inescapable in
the transference: "As long as the patient is in the treatment, he cannot escape
from this compulsion to repeat[;] in the end we understand that this is his way
of remembering."
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 65 (quoting 12 Sigmund Freud, The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 150 (James Strachey
trans., Hogarth Press 1958) (1914)).
6See, e.g., Gay, supra note 5, at 119 (describing psychoanalysis as revolutionary for
its time); Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism at xv (1974) (discussing how
most feminists view psychoanalysis "as a justification for the status-quo, bourgeois
and patriarchal .... ").
6 Lear comments upon the ambivalence in Freud's thought:
It is in this context that Freud comes across as a much more ambiguous figure than
he is normally taken to be. In one way, he is the advocate of the unconscious; in
another, he is himself filled with Enlightenment optimism that the problems posed
by the unconscious can be solved; in yet another, he is wary of the dark side of the
human soul and pessimistic about doing much to alleviate psychological pain. He is
Tiresias and Oedipus and Sophocles rolled into one.
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 31.
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chological theory of the relationship between individual and state.'
Because Freud viewed himself as a scientific observer of human
nature, he did not dwell on the political implications of his psy-
chology; he concerned himself for the most part with working out
the proper balance of freedom and repression at the level of indi-
vidual pathology rather than social organization.' Nevertheless, his
work on unconscious drives, repression, secondary process, com-
promise formation, sublimation, projection, the superego, and
group psychology, to name just a few examples, bear on the deep
interconnections between psychic and social development. Freud's
seminal ideas about psychology, psychopathology, and mental de-
velopment have made it possible for others, including Lear, to
explore the relationship between human nature and political
organization.
Lear's insights into irrationality lead him, as a student of classical
philosophy, to ask: If irrationality is inherent in mind, how does this
bear on the capacity of citizens to maintain a democratic state? In
what way, he asks, does the democratic freedom of the polity rest on
the psychic condition of its citizens? In answering these questions,
Lear draws on two main psychoanalytic insights about the relation-
ship between mental life and the world: the concept of transference
and the theory of object relations. The relevance of these two psy-
choanalytic insights to Lear's ideas about democracy will be taken
up in turn.
65 Earlier writers who have applied psychoanalytic ideas to politics include Norman 0.
Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History (1959); Erich
Fromm, Escape From Freedom (1941); Harold J. Laski, Authority in the Modem State
(1919); Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (1930); Walter Lippmann,
Preface to Politics (1913); Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical
Inquiry into Freud (1955).
6Early in his career, and in connection with his work on what he called the actual
neuroses such as neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis, Freud openly criticized the
sexually repressive moral standards of Victorian culture. See, e.g., Sigmund Freud, 1 The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 184 (James
Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1966) (1899) [hereinafter Freud, 1 Standard Edition]
("In the absence of [greater sexual freedom], society appears doomed to fall a victim to
incurable neuroses, which reduce the enjoyment of life to a minimum, destroy the
marriage relation and bring hereditary ruin on the whole coming generation."); Freud, 9
Standard Edition, supra note 8, at 131-39 (arguing for the sexual education of
children).
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Transference is a concept that recognizes the role that mind plays
in the individual's subjective experience of the real world. Early in
his career, Freud believed that the hysterical and obsessional symp-
toms suffered by his adult patients were caused by actual childhood
seductions by caregivers or family members. However, in a famous
turnabout, he soon abandoned the seduction theory as the primary
explanatory paradigm for adult neurosis. 7 Although he never de-
nied the importance of actual seductions, he came to emphasize the
primary role that fantasy plays in shaping a child's experience and
development in the earliest years. "In abandoning the seduction
theory," Lear writes, "Freud opened the door to seeing the psyche
as imaginative and active in structuring its experience."' Actual
seductions still take place, Lear explains, but "[t]o discover an ac-
tual seduction does not absolve one of the task of analyzing what
meaning this event has for the analysand-in particular, how the
memory of that event gets woven into the analysand's phantasy
life." Freud's abandonment of the seduction theory represented
an important first step in the direction of understanding the active
role that mind plays in the development of the individual's sense of
self and world.
Transference is one way to describe this active relationship be-
tween mind and world. In classical analytic thought, transference is
a technical concept that refers to the phenomenon whereby the
analytic patient transfers feelings about significant people from his
or her past onto the present.:' In clinical usage, transference:
is the tendency to repeat, in a current setting, attitudes, feelings,
impulses, and desires experienced or generated in early life in
relation to important figures in the individual's development.
These original figures are primarily the parents but may include
"See Freud, 1 Standard Edition, supra note 66, at 259-60.
"Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 128.
"Id.
See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 61. Freud conceived of transference in
economic terms: the transfer of a certain quantity of psychic energy from one idea,
usually an unconscious, infantile wish, to a present, conscious idea. In this way, the
present idea becomes cathected, or charged, with energy properly associated with the
past. See id.
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other family members or even persons outside the family who
have assumed important functional roles in actuality.
7
'
In the case of the Rat Man, for example, Freud interpreted the
patient's cringes and leaps as a transference of the patient's child-
hood fear of his father, now dead, onto Freud.' Lear expands the
meaning of the term "transference" beyond the psychoanalytic re-
lationship to include all external reality. Transference is thus one
way to describe the mind's creative power to endow the material
world with meaning. "Nietzsche admonished us to live our lives as
though we were creating a work of art. The phenomenon of trans-
ference reveals, I think, that each of us is unconsciously trying to
do just that."' The Rat Man, for example, experienced Freud as a
man to be feared; another patient might have experienced the same
Freud as a man to be loved. In both cases, Lear explains, the patient
transfers onto the objective world a meaning of his own making.
Transference becomes pathogenic, or negative, when the mean-
ings imposed by the individual on the world are wildly distorted,
frozen, or self-defeating. As Lear describes it, negative transfer-
ence locks the patient into experiencing the world passively as
"fixed, rigid, and tragic."'74 A negative transference may be said to
exist when a patient continues to view his analyst as cold and un-
caring despite clear evidence to the contrary, or when an otherwise
sensible man cannot remain in a relationship because he views all
women as liars, or when an otherwise sensible employee cannot re-
tain a job because he repeatedly experiences his employers as out
to get him. The individual remains fixed in the negative transference
until he "comes to see that he is a dramatist: creator of meanings,
rather than passive victim of a tragic world."'75 In Lear's usage, there-
fore, transference stands for the way individuals come to endow the
material world around them with meaning, positive or negative, fixed
or changing, drawn from their particular life histories.
71 Leo Stone, Transference, in Psychoanalysis: The Major Concepts 110, 110 (Burness
E. Moore & Bernard D. Fine eds., 1995).
"2See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
"Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 71-72.
7 Id. at 140.
75Id.
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The concept of transference leads to the second psychoanalytic
insight, original with Freud but later adopted by object-relations
theorists,7 that the earliest development of one's sense of self, or
ego, takes place in the context of relationships with others.' As we
discover in Lear's account, contemporary psychoanalysis offers a
richly developed theory of the dynamic process by which the indi-
vidual emerges as a subjective being in the world.' Psychoanalysis
teaches that "one can no longer take the individual as given, 79 but
that individuality is a psychological achievement set in motion by de-
velopmental forces and embedded in social relations. The individual,
Lear explains, "begins to emerge from the infant-mother dyad largely
in response to the communications flowing through that field."'' 8 Al-
though Freud commented upon the importance of early relationships
to the infant's development, he tended to view the individual as relat-
ing to others primarily as objects for the gratification of instinctual
desires.8' In contrast, object-relations theorists emphasize the role
76For an overview of object relations theories, see Jay R. Greenberg & Stephen A.
Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (1983); Otto F. Kernberg,
Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theories, in Psychoanalysis: The Major Concepts 450,
459 (Burness E. Moore & Bernard D. Fine eds., 1995). For works by object-relations
theorists, see W. Ronald. D. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (1952);
Harry Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interction: The Developing
Synthesis of Psycho-dynamic Theory (1961); Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and
Reparation, and Other Works 1921-1945 (1981) [hereinafter Klein, Love, Guilt and
Reparation]; Melanie Klein, Envy and Gratitude, and Other Works 1946-1963 (1980)
[hereinafter Klein, Envy and Gratitude]; D.W. Winnicott, The Maturational
Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional
Development (1965).
7
,"Freud, of course, understood that a person's ego and superego are formed
around internalizations of parental figures. In the analytic situation, he concentrated
on the intrapsychic configurations of the analysand, but he recognized that these
configurations are due in part to interpsychic relations." Lear, Open Minded, supra
note 6, at 328 n.1.
78 See, e.g., Klein, Envy and Gratitude, supra note 76; Klein, Love, Guilt and
Reparation, supra note 76.
7 Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 134.
s Id. This is the paradox of psychoanalytic practice, as Hans Loewald describes it: "The
unit of a psychoanalytic investigation is the individual human mind or personality .... The
individual's status in this regard, however, is questionable and cannot be taken for
granted." Loewald, supra note 48, at 278.
81 Freud tells us:
The object [Objekt] of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through
which the instinct is able to achieve its aim. It is what is most variable about an
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that early relationships, especially the pre-Oedipal relationship
with a maternal figure, have in constituting the infant's emerging
sense of self and worldY
Object relations theory provides Lear with the conceptual frame-
work for his account of the relationship between individual and
world. The theory confirms that the transference of subjective feel-
ings onto the real world is not a one-way street: What we call the
real world structures subjective experience in important ways. The
world around us determines what can be perceived and, through
processes of memory and internalization, shapes the psychic mecha-
nisms by which the individual experiences the world. "[From a
properly psychoanalytic perspective, reality must always be under-
stood as reality as it exists for an ego. The ego's developmental
task is not merely to develop itself, but to develop its relations with
what, for it, is an ever more complex world."' Object relations the-
ory views the most important influence on the mind's capacity to
structure its experience of the world to be the infant's interactions
with its early caregivers: The external world comes to have mean-
ing for the child as mediated by and through these early emotional
attachments. In this way the lifelong dynamic relationship between
the real world of the caregiver and the subjective experience of the
individual begins.
Lear uses the concept of transference and the theory of object
relations to develop his claim that the relationship between the in-
dividual and the political state-psyche and polis-is rooted in the
earliest exchanges of external caregiving and subjective experience.
In a chapter entitled "Inside and outside the Republic," Lear finds
instinct and is not originally connected with it.... The object is not necessarily
something extraneous: it may equally well be a part of the subject's own body.
It may be changed any number of times.
14 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud 122-23 (James Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1957) (1915).
82 A more clinical definition of object relations theories is offered by Otto Kernberg:
[Psychoanalytic object relations theories are] defined as those that place the
internalization, structuralization, and clinical reactivation (in the transference
and countertransference) of the earliest dyadic object relations at the center of
their motivational (genetic and developmental), structural, and clinical
formulations.
Kernberg, supra note 76, at 450.
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 130-31.
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the origins of this idea in the work of Plato. He focuses on what he
describes as "the most distinctive aspect of Plato's psychology: a
dynamic account of the psychological transactions between inside
and outside a person's psyche, between a person's inner life and his
cultural environment, between intrapsychic and interpsychic rela-
tions."" Plato's view of the relationship between psyche and polls is
not merely analogical, as Lear argues many commentators have
mistakenly assumed. Instead, to Lear, mind and polis are two parts
of an organic whole, each of whose condition affects the balance
and harmony of the other.' During infancy and childhood, the
process of internalizing the norms and habits of thinking possessed
by caregivers and other significant people is primary; in adulthood,
the process of projecting or externalizing those norms, not only in
the raising of children, but also in the building of political, social,
and other institutions, takes precedence.
The processes of internalization and externalization are classical
psychoanalytic concepts. Freud understood the process of inter-
nalization as serving in some instances to repress instinctual wishes;
the most important example of internalization in classical Freudian
thought is the repression of Oedipal longings, a process that leads
to the development of the superego, the seat of moral norms and
self-criticism.' We might consider, for example, that the norms of
justice are internalized at a very early age as children learn, under
the guidance of caregivers, to channel their primitive envy and ag-
gression into appeals to fairness.' Plato had a somewhat different
idea of internalization, Lear tells us, one premised on the process,
often unconscious, of mirroring the virtues to which one is exposed
at an early age. Yet however one understands the specific process
of internalization, (and it is not entirely clear how Lear himself
views it)' the important point is that we internalize cultural and
political norms at the earliest age, "before we can understand their
"Id. at 219-20.
8See id. at 239.
6See id. at 98-100. See also David Beres, Conflict, in Psychoanalysis: The Major
Concepts 477,479 (Burness E. Moore & Bernard D. Fine eds., 1995).
"Ernst Prelinger raised this point with me in conversation. See also Jeremy Paul, A
Bedtime Story, 74 Va. L. Rev. 915 (1988).
"s See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 329-30 n.15.
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significance,"' and that this process of internalization is necessary
"for acquiring psychological structure."' Similarly, externalization,
as Lear finds it in Plato, "is a basic psychological activity,"'" a kind
of group transference, if you will, by which adults actively partici-
pate in the creation of a shared, semiautonomous culture passed on
to future citizens. Lear explains:
Although the polls is dependent on our enduring commitment,
and although it reflects our collective psychic activity, it is not
just psychology. Rather, we have created an environment which
our psyches can, for better or worse, inhabit .... In general, so-
cial institutions-law, medicine, the university, the corporation,
art-reflect our interests and depend on our enduring commit-
ments, but they cannot be reduced to our psychological states.
These institutions are artifacts [of our creation], and they help
to constitute a social world, a polis, in which we locate our-
selves.'
In Lear's reading, therefore, Plato's Republic stands for the
proposition that "[p]syche and polis are mutually constituted by a
series of internalizations and externalizations, with transformations
occurring on both sides of the border."' The creation of the polis,
Lear argues, is a product of "our joint contributions to the creation
and maintenance of the social world," a world that then "gains a
certain independence from the shifting psychological states of itsinhabitants. ' 'g4
The importance of Lear's connection between politics and irration-
ality becomes evident here: Given the immanence of irrationality, the
dynamic between psyche and polis not only constitutes the social or-
der, but also, paradoxically, threatens its demise. If what it means to
be minded is to experience lapses from rationality, then the capac-
ity of citizens to achieve our normative ideal of democracy is
obviously put in question. "According to Socrates in the Republic,
even when the human psyche is in the best of shape, even when the
19Id. at 224.
9Id. at 238.
91Id. at 238.
9 Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
9Id. at 226.
9Id. at 66; see also id. at 219-20.
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most basic form of political organization, the polis, is in the best of
shape, each will have to struggle with internal as well as external
threats to its integrity."' More fundamentally, if what it means to be
minded is to be subject to irrational, inexplicable, and often uncon-
scious feelings, then it is inevitable that, in the dynamic between
mind and polis, these feelings find their way into the political sphere:
If we examine Plato's tale of political decline, we see that the
degeneration occurs through a dialectic of internalization of
pathological cultural influences in individuals which provokes a
degeneration in character structure (as compared to the previ-
ous generation), which is in turn imposed on the polis, which
thus acquires and provokes deeper pathology. Plato does not
merely want to show that the same neurotic structure can exist
in both psyche and polls, but that the pathology in each helps to
bring about pathology in the other.'
The dynamic between psyche and polis creates the possibility
that the archaic, unconscious feelings of a citizenry could be politi-
cally mobilized for destructive ends, potentially resulting, in the
most extreme cases, in democratic support for a political regime
given over to religious persecution or ethnic cleansing. The sudden,
destructive outbreak of irrational desires on the political level, such
as what happened, some would say democratically.' in Nazi Ger-
many, would be the social equivalent to the Rat Man's leaping and
cringing." More commonly, we might find the destructive eruption
of these feelings in more everyday acts of violence and aggression,
including not only random assaults but hate crimes and other acts
of political violence. Whereas the prevailing ideal of liberal pro-
gress might view these everyday acts of violence as exceptions to
the rule of civilized society, Lear would argue that such acts repre-
sent the tendency to social disintegration immanent in the very
nature of human organization.
Given his views on irrationality, Lear concedes that "it might
look as though the recognition of a dark strain running through the
95 Id. at 89.
96Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted).
97See, e.g., Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary
Germans and the Holocaust (1996).
See Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 186.
2000] 375
Virginia Law Review
human soul might threaten the viability of democratic culture."'
How is it, then, that "one might both take human irrationality seri-
ously and participate in a democratic ideal?"1 One response would
be to favor strong repressive safeguards on social order and politi-
cal change. Plato banished the tragic poets precisely because of
their threat to the stability of the social order:
What lie beyond logos [rational thought] for Plato are certain
forms of violence and undoing. Plato banished tragedy from the
polis because he thought it encouraged a strain of destructiveness
which logos could not contain. It does this by perverting the
process of psychosocial development. The, human psyche, for
Plato, stands in a dynamic relation to the social world it inhabits.
Primarily in youth, but throughout life, a person internalizes cul-
tural influences; and these influences, once internalized, become
motives. They are organized with other motives into an 'inner
polis,' the psyche. In maturity, a person externalizes these me-
tabolized influences in activities which help to shape, sustain, or
undo the social world. Tragic poetry, Plato thinks, turns this dy-
namic process into a vicious downward spiral."0 '
As Lear explains, Plato's approach to the irrational in human na-
ture was to banish it from the life of the polity. To the extent tragedy
awakens us to the dark and "lawless" forces within,"° it threatens the
virtue of citizens and therefore the survival of the republic. "Poet and
tyrant ultimately enslave us, but while the tyrant enforces external
compliance, poetic enslavement reaches inside the psyche and re-
organizes it so that we remain unconscious of our slavery."'"
Children in particular are susceptible to the destructive tendencies
of art and poetry; it is for that reason that Plato "begins his con-
struction of the ideal polis with a discussion of the education of
young children.""'
Not surprisingly, Lear concludes in his essay on Plato that "there
is plenty of room to doubt whether Plato's solution is called for or
9Id. at 31.
10DId.
0 Id. at 174-75.
102 Id. at 175.
"1 Id. at 245.
14 Id. at 221.
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whether it would be successful.""° Lear would clearly prefer a degree
of democratic freedom unavailable under Plato's regime. Moreover, it
appears that Lear, like Freud, doubts that any effort to banish irra-
tional and destructive desires can actually work. Lear suggests that
even the healthiest polis must struggle with the immanence of irra-
tional disruptions in the political sphere. Banishing or repressing
those disruptions risks, at the social level, "being overtaken by hor-
rific surprise.""I6 But it is not just that Lear thinks that the irrational
cannot be eradicated or imprisoned. Unlike Plato, Lear believes that
lawless desires in human nature can be taken up and integrated into
the social order in the same way that those desires can be con-
trolled or sublimated in the individual life. Lear means to
incorporate rather than repress the immanence of threats to politi-
cal stability and integrity in our culture because he views them, in
some way, as a necessary condition of genuine democratic liberty
and political health.
Lear picks up here on the strain in Freud's work that carries a
more optimistic assessment of the capacity for human autonomy. It
is true that Freud delivered a sobering message about the obstacles
to achieving personal autonomy. Freud's theory of the dynamic
unconscious, like Lear's theory of the irrational, insists on the regu-
lar absence of conscious self-control." Yet Freud also exhibited an
- Id. at 245.
106 Id. at 190.
107 Freud wrote in 1917:
In the course of centuries the naive self-love of men has had to submit to two
major blows at the hands of science. The first was when they learnt that our
earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic
system of scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with the
name of Copernicus, though something similar had already been asserted by
Alexandrian science. The second blow fell when biological research destroyed
man's supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the
animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This revaluation has been
accomplished in our own days by Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors,
though not without the most violent contemporary opposition. But human
megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the
psychological research of the present time which seeks to prove to the ego that
it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty
information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.
Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 284-85 (James Strachey
trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1966) (1917) (Lecture VIII).
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undeniable optimism regarding the potential for human beings to util-
ize unconscious feelings in ways that promote growth and change.
Rather than leading to religious stoicism or existential despair, the
idea of irrationality in psychoanalytic thought gives rise to an
Enlightenment faith in the capacities of the human mind to master,
more or less well, unconscious urges:
If, for the moment, we concentrate on the optimism [in some
accounts of Freud], we see a vision emerge of how one might
both take human irrationality seriously and participate in a de-
mocratic ideal. If the source of irrationality lies within, rather
than outside, the human realm, the possibility opens up of a re-
sponsible engagement with it. Psychoanalysis is, in its essence,
the attempt to work out just such an engagement. It is a tech-
nique which allows dark meanings and irrational motivations to
rise to the surface of conscious awareness. They can then be
taken into account, they can be influenced by other considera-
tions, and they become less liable to disrupt human life in
violent and incomprehensible ways.1O
In Lear's view, responsible engagement that seeks to integrate
rather than banish the irrational is crucial for realizing the goals of
personal autonomy and democratic self-government. Irrationality is
not just an obstacle to rational control: It is the dynamic force behind
personal autonomy and social transformation. What is dangerous and
self-destructive within us can be taken up and utilized for the con-
struction of creative, meaningful, and self-directed lives.
As Plato understood, any engagement with irrational desires,
whether responsible or not, carries the risk that those desires will
overwhelm the social order. This becomes for Lear a fact of social
existence in the same way that the danger of irrational feelings are
a fact of mindedness. But, for Lear, this does not mean that no safe-
guards are in place to keep the political order from sliding into either
anarchy or despotism. Some of these safeguards are cultural, such as
the role that art, especially tragedy, can play in controlling irrational
impulses. 9 Some involve careful attention to the developmental
"I Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 31.
109 See id. at 191-218.
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needs of future citizens, particularly education and childcare.11 But
Lear implicitly suggests that most important to the survival of a
democratic polity is the cultivation of what he calls an open-
minded citizenry. Lear draws on the methods and goals of psycho-
analysis in prescribing the norms of good democratic life. Being
open minded means taking seriously "the idea that there may be
meaning opaque to human understanding, '' . most notably irra-
tional beliefs and desires. Being open minded also involves
cultivating one's capacity for self-reflection, humility, and skepti-
cism with the goal of controlling destructively irrational impulses
and feelings. In the end, however, what Lear intends by open
minded seems less a substantive set of virtues than a virtuous way
of life. Psychoanalysis "is not essentially a body of esoteric knowl-
edge; it is a peculiar form of mental activity, a peculiar form of
speaking and listening, a peculiar form of life"' directed to self-
knowledge and social transformation.
Open minded is clearly a normative concept. Freud's understand-
ing of the ends of psychoanalysis reflected his view of the analyst as
a physician of the mind: The ends of psychoanalytic treatment were
directed to relieving the suffering of patients. The normative claim
from Freud's point of view was simply the preference for psychic
health over illness. Like most analysts today, Lear does not share
Freud's view of psychoanalysis as a natural science or of the analyst as
a neutral observer of human nature. Instead, Lear views psychoanaly-
sis in terms of a relationship between two people that, primarily
through speech, brings about lasting psychological change. It hardly
needs saying that the relief of acute suffering is a worthwhile goal of
psychoanalytic treatment, but relief from suffering can take many
forms, as the vast array of psychological approaches today confirms.
In this regard, Lear suggests that the main virtue of psychoanalysis
may be found in the fact that it is
the first therapy that sets freedom rather than some specific im-
age of human happiness as its goal. Other kinds of therapy posit
110 See generally id. at 223 (discussing the importance of early education in Plato's
theory of the polis).
1" Id. at 50.
1121d. at 34.
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particular outcomes-increased self-esteem, overcoming de-
pression-and, implicitly or explicitly, give advice about how to
get there. Psychoanalysis is the one form of therapy which
leaves it to analysands to determine for themselves what their
specific goals will be. Indeed, it leaves it to them to determine
whether they will have specific goals."'
It is true that, theoretically at least, psychoanalytic therapy does
not promote specific ends. In theory, the analyst remains morally
neutral, even if that means, for example, that the patient makes
choices that harm other people. Yet psychoanalysis's claim to
moral neutrality with respect to the particular patient is misleading:
The discipline in fact promotes an ideal of human flourishing with
its own set of human virtues. In addition to freedom, the ends of
psychoanalysis, broadly construed, include rationality, autonomy,
self-control, skepticism, humility, introspection, self-reflection, in-
tegration, coherence, empathy, and, as the vehicle for all these,
verbal articulation. The ends of psychoanalysis are not necessarily
compatible with all ways of thinking and living, particularly tradi-
tional and religious beliefs, but Lear makes a strong case for the
proposition that they are perfectly compatible with, and perhaps
necessary to, the survival of the secular democratic state.
III. STRIVING FOR RATIONALITY IN THE LAW
In one of the few direct references to law in the book, Lear
wonders "whether it isn't the point of all professions-of medicine
and law as much as philosophy and psychoanalysis-to instill
deadness."'14 Certainly there is some truth to the idea that the pro-
fessionalization of law-the establishment of fixed standards for
legal education and practice, in addition to the systematic ordering
of legal rules and processes---discourages critical inquiry and ques-
tioning. There is also some truth to the idea that many aspects of
legal thinking, including, for example, objective standards of rea-
sonableness, legal presumptions, precedent and stare decisis, seem
abstract and lifeless. As discussed earlier, there is also something
especially deadened about the model of human behavior in law
i3Id. at 22.
114 Id. at 3.
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and economics. Yet despite these tendencies, there are countless
ways in which law remains a vital endeavor."5 The drama of the
courtroom, the emotional clash of the parties, the satisfactions and
disappointments that come with seeking redress through the law,
and the hopes and fears of law reform advocates all permeate the
professional practice and culture of law. Holmes's famous maxim-
"the life of the law is not logic; it is experience"-mis as true today as
it was a century ago.1 '
Moreover, it cannot be the case that, to be fully alive, law must
tolerate irrational motives and actions in any and all circumstances,
for such a regime would quickly approach a condition of lawless-
ness. The task becomes integrating a more complex, realistic view
of human agency and rationality into law in a way that acknowl-
edges the need for social order and control. Given Lear's insight
that it is neither possible nor desirable to banish irrationality from life
or law, the remainder of this Review considers how his ideas about ir-
rationality can contribute to a richer, if more complex, legal
understanding of human agency, decisionmaking, and democratic
self-government.
A. Bounded Rationality in Law
Nowhere does the premise of rationality have a greater influence
than the field of law and economics, where the rational actor model
of human behavior has prevailed, against criticism, for over thirty
,,5 One important area where psychoanalytic ideas have had a significant and lasting
influence on legal doctrine and policy is the law regulating child custody. In 1973,
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit published Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child, the first in a trilogy of books applying psychoanalytic ideas to
the subject of child custody. See Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child (1973). The second and third books in the trilogy are Joseph Goldstein et
al., Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979) and Joseph Goldstein et al., In the
Best Interests of the Child (1986). Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's psychological parent
theory was directed to eliminating custody decisions that turned on parental rights,
parental interests, maternal presumptions, and other factors unrelated to the
developmental needs of young children. They argued in favor of a standard that would
award permanent and unconditional custody to the person who, on a continuing, day-to-
day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's
psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. See Goldstein
et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973), supra, at 98.
116 Holmes, supra note 20, at 3. •
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years.'17 Law and economics scholars are interested in studying how
individuals rationally go about achieving their goals in a world of
scarce resources."' Although the definition of rationality within law
and economics is far from agreed upon, it is fair to say that most
recent work in the field has defined rationality as the maximization
of expected utility."'9 "The task of law and economics is to deter-
mine the implications of such rational maximizing behavior in and
out of markets, and its legal implications for markets and other in-
stitutions."" Like more everyday understandings of rationality, the
expected-utility model assumes that individuals are motivated to seek
certain ends, or preferences, and that rational choices are those which
prove to be consistent with those preferences. In legal scholarship, the
paradigm of rational choice has enjoyed widespread popularity, in-
creasingly being applied to areas of decisionmaking outside the
traditional domain of the competitive market, including the arena of
family relations."'
117See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (2d ed. 1989); Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture
and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23, 26-30 (1989). One of the earliest critics to raise psychoanalytic
evidence against the model of expected utility maximization was Arthur Allen Leff in
a commentary on the publication of the first edition of Richard Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law:
What happens ... to questions of "utility" if one accepts, even as a hypothesis,
the idea of unconscious desires? In speaking about the maximization of utility,
does one rate success in achieving what people "conceive to be their self-
interest" in terms of their conscious or unconscious aims? ... Can one actually,
now, write four hundred pages about human desire without adverting to Freud,
his followers, or even his enemies?
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
Va. L. Rev. 451, 474 (1974) (quoting Posner, supra).
I's See Posner, supra note 117, at 3.
119 See Posner, supra note 117, at 3-4; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
630, 642 (1999); see also Becker, supra note 117, at 14 ("[A]I1 human behavior can be
viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of
preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information .... ).
120 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471,1476 (1998).
121See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage, (pts. I & II), 81 J. Pol. Econ. 813
(1973); 82 J. Pol. Econ. Sl (1974); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi
Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J." Legal Stud. 267 (1987);
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The model of rational choice is a simple and elegant paradigm for
human behavior," attractive characteristics in a theoretical model.
Simple models are easy to explain, and elegant models allow for a
high level of sophistication, sometimes in the form of mathematical
formulas that only a handful of thinkers can understand." Yet de-
spite the allure of simplicity, law and economics scholars have
begun to acknowledge that the neoclassical assumption of rational-
ity often fails as a descriptive model of economic actors and their
behavior.24 Turning to experimental work in cognitive psychology,
scholars have borrowed the concept of bounded rationality, al-
ready popular in the economic literature,' to help explain non-
rational behavior. The theory of bounded rationality does this by
identifying systematic, and therefore purportedly predictable, de-
viations from rational behavior. The theory focuses on cognitive
Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on
Divorce, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 879, 882 (1988); Joan Huber & Glenna Spitze, Considering
Divorce: An Expansion of Becker's Theory of Marital Instability, 86 Am. J. Soc. 75
(1980); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76
Va. L. Rev. 9 (1990).
12 But see Posner, supra note 117, at 18.
123 Matthew Rabin makes the following point about the economic model:
Because of the high premium economics places on the logic and precision of
arguments and the quantification of evidence, attending to all facets of human
nature is neither feasible nor desirable. The realization that many details of
human behavior must be ignored, however, should not license institutionalized
complacency about the behavioral validity of our assumptions ....
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Literature 11,13 (1998).
The pioneering article in the economic area was Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. I Econ. 99 (1955). See generally Jolls et al., supra note
120, at 1471 (examining "how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased
attention to insights about actual human behavior"); Symposium: The Legal Implications
of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev.
1495 (1998) (examining behavioral research and the impact of behavioral economic
analysis of law on scholarship and policy).
15Se John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. Econ. Literature 669 (1996)
(surveying empirical studies of cognitive biases suggesting that people are capable of
substantial and systematic reasoning errors relevant to economic decisions). For an
example of the genre, see Daniel Kalmeman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:
A literature Review, 51 Vand. L Rev. 1499, 1502 (1998) ("Transaction cost economics
accepts that the rationality of economic actors is 'bounded,' to use Herbert Simon's
phraseology, and bounded rationality can include cognitive imperfection as well as
informational limits.").
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biases, heuristics, and limitations that lead individuals to depart
from outcomes otherwise predicted by the neoclassical rational
choice model.1" Bounded rationality is not a refutation of the rational
actor model; to the contrary, it attempts to fine-tune the model to
take account of predictable cognitive limitations and biases."2 Despite
occasional references to irrationality in the literature," there is noth-
ing in fact irrational about bounded rationality. 9 '
From a psychoanalytic perspective, one is tempted to begin with
what is missing in the idea of bounded rationality. But it is impor-
tant initially to acknowledge that law and economics scholars doing
work in the area of cognitive psychology have several important
contributions to make. First, the model of bounded rationality
represents a desirable shift away from abstract conceptions of hu-
man nature to a more empirically grounded psychology. Unlike
neoclassical economists, who make no strong claim to the subjective
accuracy of their model,"3 behavioral law and economics scholars do
lay claim to the descriptive accuracy of their model of human behav-
-For a useful listing of the cognitive biases, heuristics, and limitations discussed in
the economic literature, see Langevoort, supra note 125, at 1503-05; Conlisk, supra note
125, at 675-83. See also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 119, at 640 ("In place of the
rational actor model, [cognitive psychologists, behavioral researchers, probability
theorists, and others] were developing a human decisionmaker model replete with
heuristics and biases, unwarranted self-confidence, a notable ineptitude for
probability, and a host of other nonrational cognitive features.").
See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 119, at 633 ("These researchers claim not
merely that we sometimes fail to abide by rules of logic, but that we fail to do so in
predictable ways."). In the economics literature, the debate over rationality goes
beyond cognitive biases to include alternative models of behavior such as learning
theory and evolutionary psychology. See Conlisk, supra note 125, at 679, 683.
' See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. Pol.
Econ. 1 (1962).
See Elster, Sour Grapes, supra note 12, at 24-27; Coleman, supra note 26, at 203;
Langevoort, supra note 125, at 1506 (noting that "identifying a departure from
rationality is not the same as discovering irrationality").
"'Richard Posner explains that "[r]ationality means little more to an economist
than a disposition to choose, consciously or unconsciously, an apt means to whatever
ends the chooser happens to have." Posner, supra note 117, at 17. In Posner's view, the
psychology of economics is entirely behavioral. One would never define irrationality in
terms of inconsistency, therefore, since preferences are defined in objective terms as
those choices the individual has made. One way to understand the shift from the
neoclassical concept of rationality to behavioral law and economics is a shift, despite
the use of the term behavioral, from an objective to a subjective psychology.
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ior. The goal of work in this field, as described by several leading
authors, "is to advance an approach to the economic analysis of
law that is informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one
that reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its
wellsprings.""' This empirical work certainly offers useful informa-
tion about how people in the aggregate might respond to particular
legal regulations. The value of this work varies depending on the
area of research; with sophisticated investors in financial markets,
the model of rationality seems more likely to approach actual deci-
sionmaking than in areas such as the family, criminal behavior, or
the labor market. Despite the fact that behavioral law and econom-
ics does not tell us which rules to adopt, in certain spheres it can
give us limited, empirical information about how particular legal
rules might affect behavior on an aggregate scale." The rise of
bounded rationality suggests that law and economics scholars are
increasingly interested in the model's explanatory and predictive
usefulness as well as its utility for setting normative standards for
behavior.
Second, the principles of cognitive psychology informing behav-
ioral law and economics scholarship recognize the important role
of unconscious processes in human decisionmiaking.'" While the
t 1Jolls et al., supra note 120, at 1473; see also id. at 1474 ("The unifying idea in our
analysis is that behavioral economics allows us to model and predict behavior relevant to
law with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions
about human behavior, and more accurate predictions and prescriptions about law.");
Simon, supra note 124, at 99 ("Im1he task is to replace the global rationality of economic
man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and
the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in
the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist.").
' In this respect, behavioral law and economics scholars can rightly claim to be working
squarely in the empirical tradition of the legal realists, many of whom, at Yale and
elsewhere, collaborated with psychologists in carrying out empirical research and writings.
Even in the economics field, the effort to make rational choice theory more empirical is
hardly new, economists have been moving in this direction ever since Herbert Simon
published his pathbreaking article on bounded rationality in 1955. See Simon, supra
note 124.
I"See Morris N. Eagle, The Psychoanalytic and the Cognitive Unconscious, in Theories
of the Unconscious and Theories of the Self 155, 155 (Raphael Stem ed., 1987) (noting
that "the concept of unconscious mental processes has gained a new respectability on the
basis of recent experimental work in cognitive psychology and perception-work that
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idea of the cognitive unconscious is very different from the idea of
the dynamic unconscious in psychoanalytic thought, acknowledging
that unconscious processes play a central role in human decision-
making is an important step in the direction of constructing a more
holistic view of mental life. The idea of unconscious processes was
first studied in depth by nineteenth-century German physiologists
who were interested in exploring how perception works.M Today,
cognitive psychologists have established that, in addition to percep-
tion, mental processes such as memory, judgment, and attention
also take place below the level of conscious awareness. Although
Freud himself would have been enthusiastic about the work on un-
conscious cognitive processes,13 including the biases and heuristics
familiar in the work of behavioral law and economics, the psycho-
analytic unconscious extends well beyond perception and memory
to include instincts, emotions, fantasies, desires, and conflicts.
Moreover, the cognitive unconscious is a vastly more rational place
than the dynamic unconscious studied by Freud. The behavioral
economist Herbert Simon once observed that "we cannot, of course,
rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better decision-maker
than the conscious,' '  an idea at odds with psychoanalytic views
about compromise formations, condensation, displacement, and other
unconscious processes. Yet despite these important differences, we
can still conclude that the attention paid by behavioral law and
economics scholars to the phenomenon of unconscious processes is
a positive, albeit limited, step.
Still more fundamentally, law and economics scholarship illus-
trates an important truth about human nature. The basic premise of
law and economics is that individuals are motivated to act rationally,
that is, to act in a way that maximizes their expected utility. This
foundational premise rests on a basic psychoanalytic principle: Hu-
man beings are reasoning animals who strive for rationality. For the
behavioral law and economics scholars and their colleagues in cogni-
tive psychology, striving for rationality may be the most we can
demonstrates the existence of ubiquitous and remarkably complex and intelligent
operations even in the absence of awareness.") (footnote omitted).
See Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, supra note 7, at 461-63.
' See, e.g., Howard Shevrin et al., Event-Related Potential Indicators of the Dynamic
Unconscious, 1 Consciousness and Cognition 340,340-41 (1992).
Simon, supra note 124, at 104.
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expect from human beings. 7 Since Milton Friedman argued a ver-
sion of this point, some economists have taken the position that
people possess bounded rationality, but that "they act as if unbound-
edly rational."'" From a psychoanalytic perspective, however, this "as
if" defense of rationality fails to acknowledge the ways in which acting
"as if rational" can be used, defensively, to hinder expected utility
maximization. As Lear's discussion of irrationality shows, and as any
astute observer of human nature knows, the human capacity for ra-
tionalization can be used to further self-defeating as well as self-
fulfilling ends.
This is the insight for legal scholars offered by Lear's analysis.
For Lear, striving for rationality and taking pleasure from rational-
izing do not make us rational beings, or even necessarily facilitate
bringing us closer to being so. Referring to the Rat Man's cringing,
Lear explains:
[I]t is precisely here that the Rat Man reflexively breaks down:
he cannot coherently say what he shows. He does not under-
stand what he is doing, and he searches for some rationalizing
explanation. It is not just that as a self-interpreting animal, the
Rat Man wants to understand what he is doing; he wants to un-
derstand himself as a rational animal. He wants to see himself
as acting for a reason. Thus he quickly constructs his more "co-
gent explanation" [that he fears Freud in the same way he
feared his father] .... [R]eason is used as a defense to cover
over unreason.1
9
In certain contexts, the human pursuit of rationality operates as
a defense against feelings of inner disorder or external chaos. This
defensive "stance of knowingness," as Lear calls it, keeps us "blind
to the realm of unconscious meaning, confident that any real hu-
man problem can be both posed and solved by the transparent use
7See id. at 101 ("Because of the psychological limits of the organism (particularly
with respect to computational and predictive ability), actual human rationality-
striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind of
global rationality that is implied, for example, by game-theoretical models."); see also
Elster, Introduction, supra note 31, at 27 (observing that "[w]e all want to be
rational").
133 Conlisk, supra note 125, at 683 (citing Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive
Economics (1953)).
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 101.
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of practical reason."'" The assumption of rationality in law and
economics, however softened by the biases and limitations of cog-
nitive psychology, comes to look very much like a defensive
rationalization against the idea that human institutions, like people
themselves, are not always logical, coherent, predictable, or stable.
Why should the general legal reader care about the concept of
rationality in behavioral law and economics? Economic thinking is
no longer confined to a small group of scholars working in discrete
areas of market transactions. As economic analysis becomes an in-
creasingly popular tool in law, economic thinking and principles,
including concepts such as bounded rationality, come to permeate
the legal culture more broadly. Apart from its influence in specific
areas of legal regulation, therefore, law and economics scholarship
promotes a model of human nature that, despite what its propo-
nents claim,"' threatens to diminish the normative legal concepts of
personal autonomy and political agency. Citizens in a liberal de-
mocracy are assumed to possess a sufficient degree of self-
knowledge about their own moral values, beliefs, and preferences to
be self-directing in their choices and behavior. Psychoanalysis shows
us why rational deliberation alone, without self-insight, does not give
rise to such self-directing behavior: An appreciation for the ways in
which behavior is affected by unconscious feelings and irrational
motivations is central to any meaningful experience over time of
individual agency and self-control.
When a young woman makes the choice to carry a pregnancy to
term, for example, she acts autonomously only in the thinnest
sense of the term if she does so in order to gratify an unconscious
infantile wish to be loved or to avoid an unconscious fear of paren-
tal punishment. What it means to act autonomously, in any but the
most formal sense of acting without external compulsion or directive,
requires some measure of self-understanding. The economic model of
rationality, whether bounded or not, misses the self-reflection and
self-understanding, the "way of life," in Lear's words, necessary for
sustaining the psychological capacity for personal autonomy and
agency over time. Although law and economics scholars tend to
14 Id. at 54.
141 See Posner, supra note 117, at 29.
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view themselves as facilitating individual choice, the reduction of
mind to rational processes in fact contributes to a legal culture in
which individuals are increasingly vulnerable to the realm of
deeper impulses and desires. Put more strongly, law and economics
can be seen to create a legal climate in which the personal auton-
omy that sustains democratic freedom is threatened.
In a recent article, two scholars in the field of law and economics
demonstrate how it might be possible to begin to incorporate psy-
choanalytic ideas into the paradigm of bounded rationality."42 Jon
Hanson and Douglas Kysar open their article on the problem of
market manipulation in products liability law with a quote from
Tennyson: "Do we move ourselves, or are moved by an unseen
hand... ?143 They consider the implications for products liability
law of viewing the relationship between seller and buyer in dy-
namic terms. What is the proper standard of liability, they ask,
when product sellers are in a position to manipulate the choices
consumers make by influencing, often unconsciously, the frame-
work for the decision or the factors taken into account? Hanson
and Kysar's consideration of interpsychic dynamics is certainly an im-
portant step in the direction of understanding human decisionmaking,
although it does not go far enough. Law and economics scholars must
begin to confront the dynamics of intrapsychic as well as interpsychic
factors, the role the unconscious plays in these dynamics, the disrup-
tive effects of irrational thoughts and feelings in everyday life, and
the developmental viscissitudes of rationality over the course of a
lifetime. These scholars, with their obvious interest in empirical
work and experimental methods, would seem to be well-equipped
for the task of developing a legal model of human decisionmaking
that takes into account psychoanalytic evidence of the immanence
of irrationality in human experience.
B. Irrationality in Law
Lear's ideas about irrationality have important implications for
many areas of legal doctrine and constitutional jurisprudence. Of
142See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 119.
113 Id. at 633 (quoting Alfred Lord Tennyson, Maud, Locksley Hall, and other
Poems 14 (1891)).
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particular interest to me is the way that psychoanalysis can deepen
the conception of citizenship that underlies constitutional protec-
tion for individual rights and democratic processes. Central to the
notion of citizenship in our constitutional scheme is the individual's
capacity for mature, rational, autonomous decisionmaking about
both personal life choices and the collective good. The two central
defining features of liberal citizenship-autonomy and rational-
ity-presuppose this psychological status as a given without explicit
consideration of what it means to possess such mental qualities or
how those qualities are in fact acquired and maintained.1" Lear, by
contrast, asks us to consider how the human striving for rationality
is a developmental outcome.43 An appreciation for the basic insights
of dynamic and developmental psychology opens up new and pro-
vocative ways of looking at the self-reflective, deliberative
decisionmaking that underlies the idea of individual autonomy.'" Al-
though liberal thinkers in recent years have come to recognize the fact
that individuals are embedded in familial and social communities, and
that individual values are constituted, at least in the first instance, by
those communities, relatively little attention has been paid by legal
scholars to the developmental dimensions of the self. In Lear's
rendition, psychoanalysis gives us a model for assessing the politi-
cal role of family life in the democratic state by leading us to
consider the importance of families and early caregivers to the psy-
chological development of civic virtues. The process by which
citizens acquire the psychological capacities for democratic citizen-
ship-virtues such as autonomy, rationality, tolerance, deliberation,
and civility-and the way that families and other social institutions
144 See Peter Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modem Liberalism at xi (1999)
(describing the liberal way of life as an achievement that "demands of individuals
specific virtues or, to speak less formally, certain qualities of mind and character-
such as reflective judgment, sympathetic imagination, self-restraint, the ability to
cooperate, and toleration-that do not arise spontaneously but require education and
cultivation").
14s See also Langevoort, supra note 125, at 1526 ("What is interesting, and what
Elster sees, is that individual cognitive biases may also have their origins in the need to
make sense-to a greater degree than is justified-of a confusing, chaotic world .... ).
Cf. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality 57-59,
124 (1989) (discussing the roles of instinct in difficult or close decisions).
1 See Dailey, Federalism and Families, supra note 17, at 1846-49.
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instill (or inhibit) and sustain (or debilitate) those virtues, are un-
derlying themes in Lear's book and important areas of study from
a psychoanalytically informed perspective.
How would a psychoanalytic understanding of democratic citi-
zenship alter extant legal principles and norms? Given the crucial
role of the family in developing the liberal virtues of rationality and
autonomy, we might conclude, as Susan Moller Okin does, that the
family is a sphere of justice to which liberal norms of equality and
fairness should apply, at least in some circumstances.147 We might ad-
just our notions of family privacy, parental rights, and child custody to
account explicitly for the collective interest in the psychological de-
velopment of future citizens. We might reexamine our conception of
political authority in light of psychoanalytic work on group psychol-
ogy. We might recognize the important role that early education
plays in inculcating the values of liberal citizenship and in training
young children to think critically and rationally.1" We might also
think about expanding the state's educational mission to include,
through subjects like art, literature, history, psychology, and phi-
losophy, instruction in the importance of self-reflection and self-
knowledge to a democratic and anti-authoritarian way of life.
Psychoanalytic ideas about irrationality can also inform our un-
derstanding of the fundamental constitutional principles of privacy
and equality. A model of human nature that overlooks the central
role of psychodynamic processes inevitably results in an impover-
147 See Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989). Although Okin's
proposal seems much more radical, we already apply liberal norms in a limited
fashion when the veil of family privacy is removed, such as at the time of divorce. See
Dailey, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 17.
"4 See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987)
(noting that "one of the major objectives of public education is the 'inculcat[ion of]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system"')
(citations omitted); William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and
Diversity in the Liberal State 241 (1991); Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in
Liberalism and the Moral Life 21, 33 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) ("To foster
well-informed and self-directed adults must be the aim of every effort to educate the
citizens of a liberal society."); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut
Me Out:" Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 581 (1993); ("It has been taken for granted that young people must be
shaped into citizens and that public institutions have both the right and the
responsibility to take the lead in shaping them.").
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ished jurisprudence in a wide variety of important cases. Under-
standing the role of unconscious emotions and motivations would
seem vital in areas of personal decisionmaking such as whether to
carry a pregnancy to term, whether to end one's own life or the life
of a terminally ill family member, whether one's children should
have access to condoms in school, or whether an unmarried bio-
logical father should be allowed to raise his daughter. Similarly,
understanding the psychoanalytic roots and mechanisms of discrimi-
nation, and particularly the role of irrational fears and hatreds, would
appear to be a crucial task for anyone purporting to make responsible
legal doctrine in the field. Relying on psychoanalytic literature,
Charles Lawrence has written about how "a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation."'49 Lawrence argues that the Washington v. Davis dis-
criminatory intent standard for proving unconstitutional race-based
discrimination "ignores much of what we understand about how the
human mind works" and "disregards both the irrationality of racism
and the profound effect that the history of American race relations
has had on the individual and collective [i.e., cultural] uncon-
scious."'50 Lawrence's analysis of the irrational roots of racism has
much in common with Lear's views on the socially disruptive effects
of irrational desires and feelings: "Racism is irrational in the sense
that we are not fully aware of the meanings we attach to race or why
we have made race significant. It is also arguably dysfunctional to
the extent that its irrationality prevents the optimal use of human
resources..'.' Lawrence's insights demonstrate the inadequacy of the
simplified view that human behavior is always, or most often, the
product of conscious intent and rational choice. Although many peo-
ple guilty of discriminatory conduct certainly fit an "intentional bigot"
model, Lawrence argues that the greatest barrier to racial equality
comes from the unconscious motivations of ostensibly well-
intentioned citizens. How to move these citizens collectively to reflect
on the unconscious sources of their behavior and whether to provide
149 Lawrence, supra note 8, at 322 (footnote omitted).
1Id. at 323.SId. at 330.
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legal remedies for that behavior are the important subjects of Law-
rence's work.
Many other doctrinal areas suggest themselves for study using
the insights of psychoanalysis. I think immediately of the reason-
able person standard in tort law, mens rea in criminal law, the
question of welcomeness in sexual harassment law, the standard of
consent in rape, the reliability of criminal confessions, the notion of
competency in trusts and estates, and many other areas where legal
liability turns on individual decisionmaking, choice, motive, or in-
tent. More broadly, too, Lear's thesis bears on our understanding
of legal institutions and the values they purport to serve. The role
of irrationality in the decisionmaking of the jury, including jury
nullification, may be a fruitful avenue for future study; issues such
as witness identification, admissibility of recovered memories, pre-
dictions of future violence, and recovery for emotional pain and
suffering are further examples of areas that merit attention. The
psychological significance of plea bargaining, confession, media-
tion, and having one's day in court all bear on the values these
legal procedures and institutions serve.
Finally, I believe that Lear's views about irrationality have impor-
tant application in the area of free speech, where the United States
Supreme Court has made room for the protection of offensive, emo-
tional, disputatious, even hateful speech. By allowing speech of this
nature to enter the sphere of public deliberation, however disruptive
it might be to civilized discussion, the Supreme Court may be pro-
viding the public mechanism by which irrational feelings and
impulses are integrated into democratic life. The interchange Lear
identifies between the psyche and the polis points to the deep con-
nection between the First Amendment values of self-expression
and collective self-determination. The centrality of speech to the
ends of psychoanalysis provides a fertile paradigm for the impor-
tance of protection for expressive, uncivilized speech, both on the
couch and off, to the democratic polity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Psychoanalytic observation from the days of Freud has always
ranged between the two extremes of common-sense wisdom about
ordinary experience and wildly speculative pronouncements on
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human nature. Freud launched his revolutionary psychology on the
basis of such simple observations that missed anniversaries and
forgotten dates have meaning, confirming what every neglected
spouse and spurned lover has always known; Freud also announced
the existence of a death drive that has never been clinically con-
firmed in the way he imagined. Lear has a touch of the
speculative cowboy in him, too, at times at the expense of more
careful, empirically grounded argument. Ironically, it is perhaps
his most wildly speculative observation-that psychoanalysis is
necessary to democracy-that seems the most original and prom-
ising contribution in this intelligent and wide-ranging collection of
essays.
Although Lear is a trained psychoanalyst, his collection of essays
is undeniably the work of a philosopher.'2 He refers to psycho-
analysis as a "science of subjectivity,"' ' but openly disputes the
idea of scientific standards being relevant to psychoanalysis:
[A]s soon as one enters the realm of meaningful explanation
one has to employ different methods of validating causal claims
than one finds in experimental physics. And it is simply a mis-
take to think that therefore the methods of validation in
ordinary psychology or in psychoanalysis must be less precise or
fall short of the methods in experimental physics. 4
Lear never explains what these methods of validation might be,
and I consider it a minor shortcoming of the book that Lear does not
address the science question in greater depth. As lawyers, we would
want to know more before concluding that psychoanalytic ideas
should not be evaluated by the same standards of scientific investiga-
tion and proof applied in the natural sciences.55 The fact that
In Lear comments:
Philosophers have sometimes complained that psychoanalysis is not an
empirical discipline, that it is not a "science." This seems to me a reason for
hope, not disdain: for perhaps reflection on the therapeutic model will shed
light on how to proceed philosophically in a way which is neither a
methodology of the sciences nor a purely transcendental investigation.
Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 272.
Id. at 317 n.11 (citing Lear, Love and Its Place in Nature, supra note 15, at ch.1).
- Id. at 24.
- The most well known critique of psychoanalysis as a science is Adolf Grflnbaum,
Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis: A Study in the Philosophy of
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psychoanalysis has not yet proven itself a scientifically rigorous disci-
pline might be, to borrow Lear's words, "a reason for hope, not
disdain."56 Cognitive, behavioral, and neuroscientific approaches to
understanding mind and human behavior continue to prove them-
selves useful but incomplete models of human nature, with no
capacity for synthesizing the various findings into a coherent frame-
work.
At the same time, psychoanalytic researchers and scholars have
begun to recognize the pressing need to establish the empirical va-
lidity of their enterprise. Most of this work must be carried out by
clinicians with the hard data gathered in the course of providing
psychoanalytic therapy.' Some of this work is already being done
at the intersection of cognitive psychology and poychoanalysis. 8
And some of this work is being done by researchers in the fields of
neuroimaging and neuropsychiatry. 9 Even the philosopher Karl
Popper, whom critics cite most often for the proposition that psy-
Psychoanalysis (1993). See also Howard Shevrin, Is Psychoanalysis One Science, Two
Sciences, or No Science at All?: A Discourse among Friendly Antagonists, 43 J. of the
Am. Psychoanalytic Ass'n 963 (1995) (examining arguments for and against
psychoanalysis as science).
Lear, supra note 6, at 272.
157 For a sampling of recent work in this vein, see Psychoanalytic Process Research
Strategies (Hartvig Dahl et al. eds., 1988); Research in Psychoanalysis: Process,
Development, Outcome (Theodore Shapiro & Robert N. Emde eds., 1995); Marshall
Edelson, Is Testing Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Psychoanalytic Situation Really
Impossible?, 38 Psychoanalytic Stud. Child 61 (1983); Enrico E. Jones & Michael
Windholz, The Psychoanalytic Case Study: Toward a Method for Systematic Inquiry,
38 J. Am. Psychoanalytic Ass'n 985 (1990).
' See, e.g., Wilma Bucci, Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Science (1997); Theories of the
Unconscious and Theories of the Self (Raphael Stem ed., 1987); Cornelis Wegman,
Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychology: A Formalization of Freud's Earliest
Theory (1985).159 See, e.g., Morton F. Reiser, Memory in Mind and Brain: What Dream Imagery
Reveals (1990); Morton F. Reiser, Mind, Brain, Body: Toward a Convergence of
Psychoanalysis and Neurobiology (1984); Morton F. Reiser, Converging Sectors of
Psychoanalysis and Neurobiology: Mutual Challenges and Opportunity, 33 J. Am.
Psychoanalytic Ass'n 11 (1985). The Arnold Pfeffer Center for Neuropsychoanalysis,
affiliated with the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, sponsors several research groups
currently exploring issues such as Consciousness, Neuro-Imaging in Psychiatry, Early
Mental Development, Clinical Studies in Neuropsychoanalysis, and Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome from an interdisciplinary perspective. See The Bulletin of the New York
Psychoanalytic Institute and Society 1999-2000, at 46-47.
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choanalysis is not a science," expressed optimism in this regard: "I
personally do not doubt that much of what Freud and Adler say is
of considerable importance, and may Well play its part one day in a
psychological science which is testable.''
1
It is worth concluding with the observation that this eclectic col-
lection of essays is itself a study in open mindedness. "I am less
concerned," Lear explains, "with trying to persuade the reader of
any particular thesis than with showing various ways in which phi-
losophical and psychoanalytic questions might be pursued with a
sense of liveliness and openness."" It is certainly true that the
sheer variety and breadth of these essays raise some resistance in
the reader: One wonders at times if Lear is totally in control of his
own subject matter. But resistance of this sort-the desire for clear
order, logical progression, well-developed themes, rational connec-
tions-may be exactly the kind of closed-minded thinking Lear
wishes to challenge. The legal reader, in particular, must work to
find connections among topics as diverse as Plato, Freud, and Witt-
genstein, but the intelligence and creativity that Lear brings to his
subject matter more than reward the effort.
1 Popper defines "scientific" in the following way: "A theory which is not refutable by
any conceivable event is non-scientific." Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations:
The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 36 (2d ed. 1962).
161 Id. at 37.
1,,Lear, Open Minded, supra note 6, at 15.
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